### Leveraging Correlations in Utility Learning

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## People-Building-Grid Nexus

sotiefacting Detection

### Internet of Things (IoT)

### **Smart building**



Agile operations in buildings → Occupants take real time control → Building "senses" grid – occupants actions Building respects comfort, productivity, wellbeing, satisfaction

## **People-Building-Grid Nexus**



## <u>The M\$ question</u> – How to learn about people's preference from their actions?



## Leveraging social coalitions can better understand/influence people's behaviors

Engaging people in a game improves energy efficiency and occupant comfort **Motivation** 

### **Energy efficiency via gamification**

**Utility learning framework** 

Leveraging correlations

**Conclusion and on-going works** 

## Energy efficiency via gamification



Social Game for Building Energy Efficiency: Incentive Design - (Allerton 2014)

## Social game for building energy efficiency

- Social game for changing occupant energy – related behaviors.
- □ 20 occupants
- □ Weekly lottery w/ Amazon cards





## Social game for building energy efficiency

## Real time control for shared lights and HVAC

Social Game			How will you save energy?				
Comfort	Points	Energy Use	Energy Commitment	Game Rule	Winners		

#### Summer 2014 - Week 12

Light Group B Target: 90.0%	Climate Group North Target: 74.0°F				
Brighten	Warm				
<b>52.0%</b>	76.1°F				
Other Votes	Other Votes				
Dim	Cool				

		Quota	Commitment	Actual	Points	Bonus	Running Poir	nt lota
Energy	Aug. 15, 2014	130 Wh	Wh	1.24 Wh	0	5		
Lights	Aug. 15, 2014	90.0%		0.5%	5,427	100		5,52
HVAC	Aug. 15, 2014	74.0°F		78.0°F	3,031	100		3,13
Grand Point Total	1							8,66
			† Update ↓					
	Energy	Lig	hts	HVA	C		Total	
10k								
7.5k								
5k								
oints								
2.5k				_				
0k		lapolo						
				1				
-2.5k							Highcharts.co	m

 Points are used to determine probability of winning in lottery

"Use less to gain more"

## People play Nash equilibrium

Each occupant selects



 $\theta_i$ : tradeoff between comfort and desire to win

### Definition

A collection of lighting settings  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is a Nash equilibrium if no occupant can increase his utility by selecting a different lighting setting  $x'_i$  i.e. for each  $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ 

 $f_i(x_i, x_{-i}) \ge f_i(x'_i, x_{-i},) \ \forall \ x'_i \in [0, 100]$ 

(1)

### Nash characterized by KKT conditions

Occupant i's parameterized utility function:

$$f_i(x_1^{(k)}, x_2^{(k)}, \cdots, x_n^{(k)}) = -(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n x_j^{(k)} - x_i^{(k)})^2 - \theta_i \underbrace{\rho(\frac{x_i^{(k)}}{100})^2}_{\text{desire to win}}$$

- Each x<sub>i</sub><sup>(k)</sup> is approximately a Nash equilibrium point.
- Residuals defined by the stationarity and complementary slackness conditions:

$$\begin{split} r_{s,i}^{(k)}(\theta_i,\mu_i) &= D_i \; f_i(x_1^{(k)},x_2^{(k)},\cdots,x_n^{(k)}) + \sum_{j=1}^2 \mu_j^j D_i h_{i,j}(x_i^{(k)}) \\ r_{c,i}^{j,(k)}(\mu_i) &= \mu_i^j h_{i,j}(x_i^{(k)}), \;\; j \in \{1,2\} \\ \end{split}$$
where  $h_{i,1}(x_i^{(k)}) &= 100 - x_i^{(k)}, h_{i,2}(x_i^{(k)}) = x_i^{(k)}$ 

# Least Squares (cOLS)

From the KKT conditions of Nash, one can formulate cOLS:

$$Y = X\beta + \epsilon, \ \beta \in \mathcal{B}$$

where  $E(\varepsilon|X) = 0^{n_d \times 1}, \operatorname{cov}(\varepsilon|X) = \sigma^2 I^{n_d \times n_d}$  is "spherical" noise.

However, this estimator often performs "poorly", due to this strong assumption on *"spherical noise structure"*.

Besides, data is often expensive and *limited*!

## People often vote as a group..

# We can design *utility with player coalition* based on the *correlation matrix*.

## Leveraging correlations among players



## Estimate correlations between occupants

	2	6	8	14	20
	0.04	0.06	-2.80	-5.19	0.03
	0.06	7.84	-16.8	0.84	-0.02
	-2.80	-16.8	$6.4 \times 10^4$	<b>4.28</b> ×10 <sup>4</sup>	-7.60
ŀ	-5.19	0.84	<b>4.28×10</b> <sup>4</sup>	$8.84 \times 10^{4}$	-12.6
)	0.03	-0.02	-7.60	-12.6	0.07

### Contributions

- Boost performance using OLS
- Reduce computational complexity
- □ Transfer to online learning



(Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology)

## Utility function based on correlation

$$\widehat{g}_{i}(x_{i}, x_{-i}) = \sum_{l \in Q_{i}} \frac{\alpha_{il}}{c_{il}} \widehat{f}_{l}(x_{i}, x_{-i})$$

$$\widehat{g}_{i}(x_{i}, x_{-i}) = \sum_{l \in Q_{i}} \frac{\alpha_{il}}{c_{il}} \widehat{f}_{l}(x_{i}, x_{-i})$$
Coalition utility
$$\widetilde{g}_{M_{i}}(x_{M_{i}}, x_{-M_{i}}) = \sum_{j \in M_{i}} f_{j}(x_{M_{i}}, x_{-M_{i}})$$
Happiness Metric:  $\mathbf{H} = \widehat{f}_{i}^{\mathrm{coal}}(x^{(k)}; \widehat{\theta}_{i}^{\mathrm{coal}}) - \widehat{f}_{i}(x^{(k)}; \widehat{\theta}_{i}^{\mathrm{coal}})$ 
Coalition utility per player:  $\widehat{f}_{i}^{\mathrm{coal}}(x^{(k)}; \widehat{\theta}_{i}^{\mathrm{coal}}) = \frac{1}{|M_{1}|} \widetilde{g}_{M_{i}}(x^{(k)}; \widehat{\theta}_{M_{i}}^{\mathrm{coal}})$ 

Η

## Experimental



### Results

### Gradient boosting gives unbiased estimator



Histogram of cFGLS for Player 2 (dynamic)



## Leveraging correlation improves forecasting



# Happiness metric indicates collusion between users 8 and 14



## Conclusion







### **NEW GAMES, MORE GAMES !!!**

Shared lighting experiment at Sutardja Dai Hall with 200 occupants (4<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> floor)

Shared lighting – personal desk electrical equipment experiment at CREATE Tower (11<sup>th</sup> floor) in Singapore with 50 occupants

Personal room lighting at Graduate Hall dorms in Eco Campus in Singapore with 100++ occupants







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